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Abstract. Auction is widely regarded as an effective way in dynamic spectrum
redistribution. Recently, considerable research efforts have been devoted to de-
signing privacy-preserving spectrum auctions in a variety of auction settings.
However, none of existing work has addressed the privacy issue in the most
generic scenario, double spectrum auctions where each seller sells multiple chan-
nels and each buyer buys multiple channels. To fill this gap, in this paper we
propose PP-MCSA, a Privacy Preserving mechanism for Multi-Channel double
Spectrum Auctions. Technically, by leveraging garbled circuits, we manage to
protect the privacy of both sellers’ requests and buyers’ bids in multi-channel
double spectrum auctions. As far as we know, PP-MCSA is the first privacy-
preserving solution for multi-channel double spectrum auctions. We further the-
oretically demonstrate the privacy guarantee of PP-MCSA, and extensively eval-
uate its performance via experiments. Experimental results show that PP-MCSA
incurs only moderate communication and computation overhead.
1 Introduction
Today, more and more emerging wireless technologies, such as Wifi, 4G, are
penetrating into our daily work and life. At the same time, the traditional static
and rigid spectrum allocation scheme renders the utilization of radio spectrum
severely inefficient and unbalanced. According to the survey [1], many stati-
cally allocated spectrum channels are left idle by their current owners, exagger-
ating the gap between the ever-increasing spectrum demand of wireless services
and the spectrum scarcity. Therefore, to improve and balance spectrum utiliza-
tion, dynamic spectrum redistribution has been advocated to reallocate spectrum
among primary and secondary users.
Spectrum auction is widely regarded as an effective way in dynamic spec-
trum redistribution. A large body of existing studies are focused on designing
truthful spectrum auctions, where the auctioneer is assumed to be trusted, and
bidders are stimulated to reveal their true valuations of spectrum channels. How-
ever, in many practical scenarios, the auctioneer is by nature self-interested and
not trusted. It may disclose the true valuations of bidders, which may cause se-
rious privacy vulnerabilities [2]. For example, a dishonest auctioneer may take
advantage of learning the bidders’ bids, and then tamper with the auction results
so as to increase its own profit. Or the auctioneer may sell bidders’ historical
bids for profit. Therefore, privacy preservation is critical in spectrum auctions.
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2 Z. Chen et al.
There has been significant research attention on privacy preserving auctions,
such as [3,4,5]. These schemes do not consider spectrum reusability, and thus
cannot be applied in spectrum auctions. Recently, a handful of propositions ad-
dressed privacy issues in spectrum auctions, such as [6,7,2], but most of them
focus on protecting privacy for single-sided spectrum auctions. Only a few solu-
tions such as [8] and [9], provide secure designs for double spectrum auctions.
However, they assume that in the auction each seller sells only one spectrum
channel and each buyer buys only one spectrum channel. Such one-channel as-
sumption makes the problem much more tractable, but leaves open the most
generic and practical version, the double spectrum auctions, involving multiple
spectrum sellers selling multiple channels to multiple buyers [10].
To fill this gap, in this paper, we propose PP-MCSA, a Privacy-Preserving
mechanism for Multi-Channel double Spectrum Auctions. Specifically, we man-
age to protect both sellers’ request privacy and buyers’ bid privacy for the double
spectrum auction mechanism True-MCSA [10] that supports multi-channel auc-
tions. To preserve privacy, we introduce in the auction framework of PP-MCSA
a third party, namely an agent, who cooperates with the auctioneer to perform
secure auction computations, as shown in Fig. 1. In such a framework, each
seller m submits its request value sm (i.e., the lowest per-channel selling price)
and request number cm (i.e., the number of selling channels) to the auctioneer.
Similarly, each buyer n does the same thing with its bid value bn (i.e., the highest
per-channel buying price) and bid number (i.e., the number of buying channels).
All submissions are appropriately encrypted such that all sensitive information
(i.e. request values, bid values and bid numbers) are protected from either the
auctioneer or the agent, but can be securely retrieved and computed with the
cooperation between the two parties. Therefore, as long as the auctioneer and
the agent do not collude with each other (Note that this assumption is essentially
necessary, otherwise the privacy cannot be achieved.), PP-MCSA leaks nothing
about the sensitive information to anyone except what can be revealed from the
published auction outcome.
We list our main contributions as follows:
– We propose the first privacy-preserving and practical multi-channel double
spectrum auction mechanism by combing public-key encryptions and gar-
bled circuits, filling the research gap that there is no privacy consideration
in multi-channel double spectrum auctions before.
– We design and optimize data-oblivious algorithms for multi-channel dou-
ble spectrum auction mechanism True-MCSA, which is rather complex in
auction logic, and address both the privacy and efficiency challenges.
– We fully implement PP-MCSA, and conduct extensive experiments to eval-
uate its computation and communication overhead.
The reminder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews
related work. In Section 3, the underlying mechanism is introduced and the pri-
vacy goal is given. We describe the design challenges and rationale in Section 4,
and present the detailed design of PP-MCSA and prove its privacy in Section 5.
In Section 6, we implement PP-MCSA, and evaluate its performance in terms
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of computation and communication overheads. Finally, the paper is concluded
in Section 7.
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Fig. 1. Privacy-preserving auction framework for PP-MCSA
2 Related Work
In this section, we briefly review the existing works on privacy-preserving auc-
tion design, and distinguish our work from the existing ones.
2.1 Spectrum Auction
Spectrum auctions are widely used to redistribute spectrum. In the past few
years, many researches have focused on designing truthful spectrum auctions.
For example, Zhou et al. put forward TRUST[11], the first truthful double spec-
trum auction framework exploiting spectrum reusability. Chen et al. proposed
the first truthful single-sided auction mechanism TAMES[12] for heterogeneous
spectrum auctions, which allows buyers to freely bid their different preferences
to heterogenous spectrum channels. Later, Feng et al. presented the first dou-
ble auction mechanism for heterogeneous spectrum transaction [13]. Chen et al.
proposed the first double multi-channel spectrum auction scheme, True-MCSA[10].
However, all the above studies did not address the privacy preservation issues.
2.2 Privacy-preserving Spectrum Auction
In the past decade, there have been a great number of schemes for privacy-
preserving auctions [3][4][5]. These schemes were originally designed for tra-
ditional goods (e.g., painting, stamps), where each commodity can only be allo-
cated to one bidder. Unfortunately, when directly applied to spectrum auctions,
they suffer severe under-utilization due to the lack of spectrum reusability con-
sideration.
In recent years, quite a few research efforts have been made for the studies
on privacy-preserving spectrum auctions [8][9][14][15][7][2]. Most, if not all,
of them have focused on privacy preservation for single-sided spectrum auc-
tions [14][15][7][2]. Different from these works, our work addresses the generic
case of double spectrum auctions. There have been a few schemes for privacy-
preserving double spectrum auctions [8][9]. But these schemes only addressed
privacy issues for one-channel double spectrum auctions. As far as we know, we
are the first to consider privacy preservation for multi-channel double spectrum
auctions.
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3 Underlying Mechanism and Privacy Goal
In this section, we introduce the underlying mechanism of the double multi-
channel spectrum auction, and define the cryptographical protocol privacy.
3.1 TRUE-MCSA Auction Mechanism
Consider a single-round double multi-channel spectrum auction where there is
a coordinator as the auctioneer, M primary spectrum users as the sellers, and
N secondary spectrum users as the buyers. Consider the general case where
each seller sells multiple channels, and each buyer requests multiple channels.
The auction is sealed-bid and private, and each bidder (seller or buyer) submits
its request or bid to the auctioneer by itself, without knowing any information
about other bidders’ submissions.
More specifically, in the spectrum auction, a sellerm’s request is denoted by
(sm, cm) (sm > 0, cm > 1), meaning that the seller m requires the minimum
per-channel payment sm to sell cm channels; a buyer n’s bid is denoted by
(bn, dn) (bn > 0, dn > 1), representing that the buyer n is willing to pay the
maximum price bn for each channel, and wants to buy at most dn channels. We
call sm and cm the seller m’s request value and request number; and call bn and
dn the buyer n’s bid value and bid number.
An existing solution to the above-mentioned double multi-channel spectrum
auction problem is True-MCSA auction mechanism [10]. We will use True-
MCSA as our underlying double multi-channel spectrum auction mechanism.
A brief review of True-MCSA auction can be found in appendix A.
3.2 Cryptographical Protocol Privacy
Implicitly, True-MCSA assumes that the auctioneer is trusted. However, if this
is not the case, True-MCSA simply leaks all requests and bids to the untrusted
auctioneer, and thus no privacy is guaranteed.
To protect the privacy of bidders in the case of an untrusted auctioneer, we
introduce an agent to cooperatively perform the auction with the auctioneer.
Intuitively, our privacy goal is that as long as the auctioneer and the agent do
not collude with each other (one of them may be semi-honest), nothing about
the sensitive inputs (i.e., bid values, bid numbers, and request values) of bidders
is leaked to them through the auction, except what is revealed from the auction
outcome. We formally present this privacy definition as follows.
Definition 1 (Privacy against semi-honest adversaries) Let f(x, y) be a two-
party deterministic auction functionality with inputs x and y from the auction-
eer and the agent, respectively, and a common auction outcome f(x, y) for both
parties. Suppose that protocol Π computes functionality f(x, y) between the
auctioneer and the agent. Let V ΠA (x, y) (resp. V
Π
B (x, y)) represent the auction-
eer’s (resp. the agent’s) view during an execution ofΠ on (x, y). In other words,
if (x, rΠA ) (resp. (y, r
Π
B )) denotes the auctioneer’s (resp. the agent’s) input and
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randomness, then
V ΠA (x, y) = (x, r
Π
A ,m1,m2, ...,mt), and
V ΠB (x, y) = (y, r
Π
B ,m1,m2, ...,mt)
where {mi}ti=1 denote the messages passed between the two parties. LetOΠ(x, y)
denote the auction outcome after an execution of Π on (x, y). Then we have
OΠ(x, y) = f(x, y) for correctness, and say that protocol Π protects pri-
vacy against semi-honest adversaries if there exist probabilistic polynomial time
(PPT) simulators S1 and S2 such that
S1(x, f(x, y))
c≡ V ΠA (x, y) (1)
S2(y, f(x, y))
c≡ V ΠB (x, y) (2)
where
c≡ denotes computational indistinguishability.
4 PP-MCSA:Design Challenges and Rationale
In this section, we summarize the main challenges in our design, followed by
our design rationale to tackle them.
4.1 Design Challenges
Recently, some secure mechanisms for double spectrum auctions, such as PS-
TRUST or SDSA [8][9], have been proposed. However, they all assumed that
in the spectrum auction a seller sells one channel, and a buyer buys one chan-
nel, and none of them addressed the privacy preservation issue in double multi-
channel spectrum auctions. To protect privacy in double multi-channel spectrum
auctions like TRUE-MCSA, we face two challenges indicated as follows.
The first one is the privacy challenge. As described in appendix A, TRUE-
MCSA involves complex operations in both “VBG splitting and bidding” and
“winner determination” steps. How to perform such operations securely by pro-
tecting the sensitive inputs is our first challenge.
The second one is the efficiency challenge. Straightforwardly securing the
auction in our context may result in heavy overhead and thus may degrade the
overall performance. Thus, how to achieve practical efficiency in terms of per-
formance with privacy guarantee consists of our second challenge.
4.2 Design Rationale
In order to tackle these two challenges above, we leverage garbled circuits
[16][17] to carefully design the boolean circuits corresponding to the auction
mechanism. Specifically, to achieve privacy, we designate binary flags to indi-
cate various conditions, and implement the auction functionality based on these
flags in a data-oblivious way; to achieve efficiency, we carefully cache some
intermediate values, so that unnecessary repeated circuits are avoided.
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5 PP-MCSA:Design Details And Proofs
In this section, we elaborate our privacy preserving spectrum auction protocol,
namely PP-MCSA, and prove that it is secure against semi-honest adversaries.
5.1 Protocol Framework
In this subsection, we present the protocol framework of PP-MCSA. Generally
speaking, PP-MCSA is a secure protocol for double multi-channel spectrum
auctions executed between the auctioneer and the agent. We distinguish two
types of inputs, insensitive and sensitive ones, among which the sensitive input
needs to be protected in the spectrum auction. We combine public-key encryp-
tion with garbled circuits to protect the sensitive input throughout the auction.
As shown in Fig. 2, our protocol consists of three phases, namely, submission,
group formation, and garbled auction computation, as specified as follows.
Phase I: Submission
In this phase, sellers and buyers encrypt their respective sensitive inputs,
and then send all the necessary inputs to auctioneer. Sensitive inputs include
all sellers’ request values, all buyers’ bid values and bid numbers, while the
insensitive inputs include all sellers’ IDs and request numbers, and all buyers’
IDs and geographic locations. For sensitive inputs, we split all of them into two
parts, and then encrypt them respectively with the auctioneer’s public key pkA
and the agent’s public key pkB . For insensitive inputs, we directly send them to
the auctioneer. The tuples that are submitted by sellers and buyers are presented
as follows.
Seller m: (idsm, 〈[s(1)m ]pkA , [s(2)m ]pkB 〉, cm) for m = 1, 2, ...,M
Buyer n: (idbn, (xn, yn), 〈[b(1)n ]pkA , [b(2)n ]pkB 〉, 〈[d(1)n ]pkA , [d(2)n ]pkB 〉) for n =
1, 2, ..., N
where [·]pkA and [·]pkB denote encryptions with pkA and pkB , respectively, and
x(1) + x(2) = x (mod 2B) for any value x, where B is the bit length used.
Additionally, we assume that all communication channels are authenticated
and secure, and no one can eavesdrop the data transmitted on the channels.
Phase II: Group Formation
Upon receiving the inputs from sellers and buyers, the auctioneer firstly con-
structs a conflict graph using all buyers’ geographic locations. Then, according
to the conflict graph, the auctioneer executes a bid-independent grouping al-
gorithm to divide buyers into different groups, such that any two members of
the same group do not conflict with each other. After group formation, the auc-
tioneer gets group set G = {G1, G2, . . . , GT }, where the size of group Gt
is denoted by Nt. An example of group formation is illustrated in step 2.1 in
Fig.2, where nodes represent buyers, edges represent conflict relations between
buyers, nodes with the same shape represent members in the same group, and
thus three groups are formed. At the end of this phase, the auctioneer sends the
agent’s encrypted shares of sensitive inputs, and the grouping information to the
agent. Then, both the auctioneer and the agent can obtain their respective shares
PP-MCSA: Privacy Preserving Multi-Channel Double Spectrum Auction 7
Auctioneer
1.1 (ids ,c ,υ )m mm
1.2 (id ,(xn , yn ),µ n)
b
n
2.1 construct conflict graph
2.2 execute grouping 
algorithm
2.3 agent's 
encrypted share 
and group 
information 2.4 decrypt its 
corresponding share
3.1 construct garbled 
circuit and agent's 
garbled input share
3.4 OT
3.3 execute OT, and get 
auctioneer's garbled input 
share
3.5 execute garbled circuit 
3.2 garbled circuit 
and agent's 
garbed input share
3.6 get the clear output 
Agent
each  seller
each buyer

BA pkmpkm
ss ][,][ )2()1(m


BA
BA
pknpkn
pknpkn
dd
bb
][,][
][,][
)2()1(
)2()1(
n ，
Fig. 2. Protocol framework: First, each buyer or seller submits its input with sensitive parts prop-
erly split and encrypted; Next, the auctioneer constructs a conflict graph of buyers, executes buyer
grouping algorithm and forwards encrypted input shares to the agent; Then, the agent obtains its
corresponding input shares by decrypting the encrypted ones, constructs a garbled circuit based
on the auction circuit, garbles its input shares, and sends the garbled circuit and garbled input
shares to the auctioneer; Finally, the auctioneer obtains its garbled input shares through running
an oblivious transfer with the agent, and executes the garbled circuit and outputs the clear result.
of sensitive inputs by decrypting the corresponding encrypted shares with their
public keys.
Phase III: Garbled Auction Computation
In this phase, the agent constructs a garbled circuit based on the auction cir-
cuit which we will design in the next subsection, garbles its shares of sensitive
inputs, and generates the output decoder which can decode the garbled output.
The garbled circuit, the agent’s garbled input shares, and the output decoder are
then sent to the auctioneer. Upon receiving these data, the auctioneer executes
oblivious transfers (OTs) with the agent to get its garbled shares of sensitive
inputs. Finally, with both garbled shares of sensitive inputs and the insensitive
inputs in hand, the auctioneer computes the garbled circuit to get a garbled auc-
tion result, and obtains the clear auction result by decoding the garbled one with
the output decoder.
The crux of this phase is to design a boolean circuit for our underlying spec-
trum auction, True-MCSA. A boolean circuit is in essence the binary represen-
tation of a data-oblivious algorithm, whose execution path does not depend on
its input. In our case, we only need to design auction algorithms which are data-
oblivious for sensitive inputs. In the next subsection, we detail our design of
such data-oblivious algorithms.
5.2 Data-oblivious Auction Algorithms
In our context, we only need to protect the sensitive inputs from both sellers and
buyers. Thus, we only need to perform sensitive input related operations in the
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garbled circuits. From here on, we represent a garbled x by [[x]], meaning that
x needs to be protected and should remain in the garbled form throughout the
computations. Our data-oblivious spectrum auction is further composed of four
steps as follows.
1) Initialization. In our algorithms, we use arrays of tuples to represent both
sellers’ and buyers’ information. Specifically, we use an array of seller tuples S
to represent all sellers, an array of buyer group tuples G to represent all buyer
groups, an array of buyer tuples Gt to represent all buyers in the group t (t =
1, · · · , T ), and an array of virtual buyer group (VBG) tuples Gvt to represent
all VBGs derived from the group t. The four types of tuples are designed as
follows.
Seller tuple: (idsj , sj , cj , wsj ), j ∈ [1..M ]
Group tuple: (idgt , b
g
t , Nt), t ∈ [1..T ]
Buyer tuple: (idbt,q, bt,q, dt,q, wbt,q), q ∈ [1..Nt], t ∈ [1..T ]
VBG tuple: (idgt , pit,k, nt,k, wvt,k), k ∈ [1..D], t ∈ [1..T ]
In a seller tuple, idsj , sj and cj are the ID, the request value, and the request
number of seller j, respectively, while wsj is a binary flag indicating whether the
seller is a winner (1) or not (0). In a group tuple, idgt , b
g
t and Nt are the ID, the
minimum buyer bid, and the size of group t. In a buyer tuple, idbt,q, bt,q, dt,q are
the ID, the bid value, and the bid number of buyer q in the group t;wbt,q describes
whether a buyer is a winner. In a VBG tuple, pit,k and nt,k are the bid, and the
size of VBG k derived from group t. wvt,k is a binary flag indicating whether the
VBG k is a winning VBG (1) or not (0). Additionally, D is the maximum bid
number of all buyers, which is set as a parameter at the beginning of the auction.
We initialize the arrays S,G,Gt andGvt as follows, where the “null” symbol
⊥ is a placeholder.
S =

j : 1 · · · M
idsj : id
s
1 · · · idsM
sj : [[s1]] · · · [[sM ]]
cj : c1 · · · cM
wsj : 0 · · · 0
 , G =
 t : 1 · · · Tidgt : idg1 · · · idgTbgt : ⊥ · · · ⊥
Nt : N1 · · · NT

Gt =

q : 1 · · · Nt
idbt,q : id
b
t,1 · · · idbt,Nt
bt,q : [[bt,1]] · · · [[bt,Nt ]]
dt,q : [[dt,1]] · · · [[dt,Nt ]]
wbt,q : 0 · · · 0
 , Gvt =

k : 1 · · · D
idgt : id
g
t · · · idgt
pit,k : ⊥ · · · ⊥
nt,k : ⊥ · · · ⊥
wvt,k : 0 · · · 0

2) VBG splitting and bidding. In this step, a data-oblivious algorithm should
be designed for VBG splitting and bidding. The challenge is that this process
depends on both buyers’ bid values and their bid numbers, which are sensitive
inputs and should be protected.
To design the data-oblivious algorithm, one difficulty is that we do not know
the buyers’ bid numbers since they are protected in garbled form, and thus we do
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not know how many VBGs should be derived from each buyer group. To over-
come this difficulty, we assume that the maximum bid number D = maxtDt
is known, and hence derive exactly D VBGs from each buyer group. To protect
both bid values and bid numbers, we keep them and their related computation
results in garbled form, while use appropriate logic circuit to implement all re-
quired operations. The resulted algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1. Note that
we only implement MMIN as the VBG bidding method, while GMAX can be
similarly implemented.
Algorithm 1 Data-oblivious VBG spplitting and bidding
Require: Tuple arrays G and {Gt}Tt=1
Ensure: The tuple array Gvt
1: for t = 1→ T do
2: for j = 1→ Nt − 1 do
3: [[λ]]← ([[bt,j ]] < [[bt,j+1]]);
4: swap(Gt, [[λ]], j, j + 1);
5: end for
6: for k = 1→ D do
7: [[nt,k]]← 0;
8: for j = 1→ Nt − 1 do
9: [[γ]]← ([[dt,j ]] ≥ k);
10: [[nt,k]]← [[nt,k]] + [[γ]];
11: end for
12: [[pit,k]]← [[bt,Nt ]] · [[nt,k]];
13: end for
14: end for
return Gvt
Some explanations about Algorithm 1 are as follows.
First, for each group t, the algorithm compares every pair of neighboring
buyer tuples (i.e., tuples j and j + 1 in Gt for j = 1 to Nt − 1) in terms of their
bid values, and swaps the two tuples if the former is smaller than the later, such
that finally the tuple with the minimum bid value is placed at the last position
of Gt (Line 2 to 5). Note that in Line 4, function swap(Gt, [[λ]], j, j + 1) swaps
the two tuples j and j + 1 of Gt if λ = 1. For each field x of the tuples, the
swapping function can be implemented using the following circuit [18]:
x′j ← ((xj ⊕ xj+1) · λ)⊕ xj
x′j+1 ← x′j ⊕ (xj ⊕ xj+1)
where x′j and x
′
j+1 represent the resulted field values. This circuit is very effi-
cient for garbled circuits, since it needs only one non-XOR gate for swapping
each pair of bits. Using the free XOR technique, garbled circuits can execute all
XOR gates nearly for free, and thus their performances are determined by the
number of non-XOR gates executed.
Second, Lines 6 to 13 compute the D VBGs for each group t. To compute
the kth VBG, the bid number of each group member except the last one (who
has the minimum bid value) is compared with k (Line 9), and if it is not smaller
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than k, the group member is added to the VBG (Line 10). Finally, the bid value
of the kth VBG is computed (Line 12).
Note that in the computations, the sensitive inputs, i.e. bt,j’s and dt,j’s, and
their related computation results, i.e., λ’s, γ’s, nt,k’s and pit,k’s, are all kept in
garbled form, such that the sensitive inputs can be well protected.
3) Winner determination. This step applies a variant of McAfee framework
to determine winners as shown in Sec. 3. Since this process contains numer-
ous operations, such as comparisons and selections, depending on requests or
bids, designing its data-oblivious version is challenging. In order to address
this challenge, our main idea is to introduce some appropriate binary flags to
indicate different conditions, and construct suitable circuits based on them to
data-obliviously achieve the required functions. We describe the data-oblivious
winner determination in Algorithm 2.
The details of Algorithm 2 are described as follows.
First, both seller tuples and VBG tuples are appropriately sorted as required
in McAfee framework (Lines 1 to 4). In Line 1, the total number of selling
channels L is computed in the clear, since initially all request numbers cj’s are
not protected. In Line 3, all VBG tuples from different groups are merged into
a uniform VBG tuple array Gv = {idvk, pik, nk, wvk}Tk=1, where idvk ∈ {idgt }Tt=1,
and then in Line 4 Gv is sorted in term of pik’s. Note that once sorted (Lines 2
& 4), all fields of S and Gv become garbled, otherwise the ranking information
of si’s and pik’s would be leaked.
Second, winners are determined with two nested for loops (Lines 5 to 22).
Specifically, the outer loop iterates over each possible trade i, and computes [[ωi]]
indicating whether trade i is profitable (Line 17), the critical request value [[ϕ]]
(Line 19), and the number of winning VBGs [[W ]] (Line 20). While the inner
loop computes the index ji of the last winning seller (Lines 8 & 13), the critical
request value ϕi (Lines 8 & 14), the number of winning VBGs Wi (Lines 9 &
15), given trade i is the last profitable trade. Note all these computations are
performed in the garbled form.
More specifically, to find the index ji of the last profitable seller provided
the last profitable trade i, we introduce two vectors of flags, i.e., λj’s and δj’s,
where
λj : indicates whether j ≤ ji, i.e.,
∑j
l=1 cl < i (λj = 1) or not (λj = 0)
(Lines 7 & 11).
δj : indicates whether j = ji (δj = 1) or not (δj = 0) (Lines 7 & 12).
According to the auction logic, the two flag vectors should take values as
the following pattern: j : 1 · · · ji − 1 ji ji + 1 · · · Mλj : 1 · · · 1 1 0 · · · 0
δj : 0 · · · 0 1 0 · · · 0

Thus, δj = λj ⊕ λj+1 holds (Line 12).
With similar idea, we compute the profitable flags [[ωi]]’s, and the critical re-
quest value [[ϕ]] (which is the request value of the critical seller) and the number
of winning VBGs [[W ]] (Lines 17 to 20, and Line 23).
It is worth noting that in Line 14, we use sj+1 instead of sj , since the critical
seller is next to the last winning seller. Additionally, in Lines 11, 15 & 17, for
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Algorithm 2 Data-oblivious winner determination
Require: Tuple arrays S and {Gvt }Tt=1
Ensure: The winning seller tuple array Ws, the winning VBG tuple array Wv , and the critical
request value ϕ
1: Compute L←∑Mi=1 ci;
2: Sort S in no-descending order of si’s, s.t.
[[s1]] ≤ [[s2]] ≤ ... ≤ [[sM ]]
3: Merge Gv ← ⋃Tt=1Gvt ;
4: Sort Gv in no-increasing order of pik’s, s.t.
[[pi1]] ≥ [[pi2]] ≥ ... ≥ [[piK ]]
5: Q← min{L,K}; [[ϕ]]← 0; [[W ]]← 0;
6: for i = 1→ Q do
7: [[λM ]]← 0; [[δM ]]← 0;
8: [[ji]]← 0; [[ϕi]]← 0;
9: [[Wi]]← 0;
10: for j =M − 1→ 1 do
11: [[λj ]]← [∑jl=1[[cl]] < i];
12: [[δj ]]← [[λj ]]⊕ [[λj+1]];
13: [[ji]]← [[ji]] + [[δj ]] · j;
14: [[ϕi]]← [[ϕi]] + [[δj ]] · [[sj+1]];
15: [[Wi]]← [[Wi]] + [[δj ]] ·∑jl=1[[cl]];
16: end for
17: [[ωi]]← [(∑il=1[[pil]]) ≥ i · [[ϕi]]];
18: if i > 1 then
19: [[ϕ]]← [[ϕ]] + [[ϕi−1]] · ([[ωi−1]]⊕ [[ωi]]);
20: [[W ]]← [[W ]] + [[Wi−1]] · ([[ωi−1]]⊕ [[ωi]]);
21: end if
22: end for
23: [[ϕ]]← [[ϕ]] + [[ϕQ]] · [[ωQ]];[[W ]]← [[W ]] + [[WQ]] · [[ωQ]];
24: Reveal [[W ]], and Wv ← the first W tuples of Gv;
25: Reveal [[jW+1]], and Ws ← the first jW+1 tuples of S;
26: Reveal [[ϕ]] as the critical request value;
27: Resort Wv in increasing order of idgt ’s, and then in no-increasing order of pik’s;
28: Resort Ws increasing order of idsj ’s;
return Ws,Wv, ϕ;
simplicity, we repeatedly use the sum equations of cl’s or pil’s. However, in real
implementation, it is not necessary to repeatedly compute the sums. Optimally,
we can compute each sum just once, and cache them for later use.
Finally, some garbled results are appropriately revealed. Specifically, the
number of winning VBGs [[W ]] is revealed, and the first W tuples of Gv form
the winning VBG tuple array Wv (Line 24). Then, [[jW+1]] is revealed as the
number of winning sellers, and the first jW+1 seller tuples of S form the winning
seller tuple array Ws (Line 25). Next, [[ϕ]] is revealed as the critical request
value(Line 26). At the same time, Wv and Ws are appropriately resorted, such
that the bid order of winning VBGs from different groups and the request order
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of winning sellers will not be revealed when decoded in the later (Lines 27 &
28). At last, Wv, Ws, and ϕ are returned.
4)Pricing. In this step, we compute the selling prices for winning sellers and
the buying prices for winning buyers, as described in Algorithm 3. Specifically,
each winning seller m sells all its cm channels, and is paid by its selling price
psm = cm · ϕ (Lines 1 to 4). Each winning VBG k is charged by its bid pik,
which is evenly shared by the winning buyers in the VBG. Thus, each winning
buyer n ∈ Gt is charged by its buying price pbn = min(dn, Dt) · bgt , where
Dt =
∑
V ∈Wv [V.id
v
k = id
g
t ] is the total number of winning channels for group
Gt, and b
g
t = pit,k/(nt,k − 1) is the minimum bid value of group Gt. Note that
Lines 5 to 9 compute the set of winning buyer groups Gw, and Lines 10 to 18
compute the winning buyers in all winning groups and their prices.
Algorithm 3 Pricing
Require: The winning seller tuple array Ws, the winning VBG tuple array Wv , and the critical
request value ϕ;
Ensure: Winners and their clearing prices;
1: for E ∈Ws do
2: Reveal E.idsm;
3: Seller m sells cm channels, and is paid with psm ← cm · ϕ;
4: end for
5: Gw ← φ;
6: for V ∈Wv do
7: Reveal V.idvk as id
g
t ;
8: Gw ← Gw ∪ {t};
9: end for
10: for t ∈ Gw do
11: Dt =
∑
V ∈Wv [V.id
v
k = id
g
t ];
12: for q = 1→ Nt − 1 do
13: Reveal idbt,q as idbn;
14: [[ht]]← min([[dn]], Dt);
15: Reveal [[ht]] and [[bgt ]];
16: Buyer n buys ht channels, and pays pbn ← ht · bgt ;
17: end for
18: end for
return All winners and their prices;
5.3 Security Analysis
In this section, we prove that our protocol preserves privacy in the sense of
cryptography.
Theorem 1. As long as the auctioneer and the agent do not collude with
each other, PP-MCSA preserves privacy against semi-honest adversaries.
Proof: The proof of privacy for both Phases I and II is trivial. The reasons
are as follows. In Phase I no secure computations are involved, sensitive in-
puts are secretly shared between the auctioneer and the agent, and hence the
view of adversary can be easily simulated. While in Phase II, group formation
is completely dependent on sensitive inputs, and no privacy issues need to be
considered. Therefore, we mainly prove the privacy of Phase III.
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To prove the privacy of garbled auction computation phase, we actually need
to prove the privacy of Algorithms 1, 2 and 3 separately, and then by applying
the sequential composition theory [19] we can conclude that the phase III pre-
serve privacy, and thus the whole protocol also preserve privacy.
We now examine the design of Algorithms 1, 2 and 3. We can see that for
every sensitive input related operation, the algorithms compute it in a garbled
circuit, and they also store every sensitive input related value by garbled values.
At the same time, all garbled values that are revealed in the algorithms carry no
more information than what can be inferred from the auction outcome. That is,
these algorithms do not revealed any information about the sensitive information
except what can be revealed from the auction outcome. By the privacy definition
in Section 3.2, when one party (the auctioneer or the agent) is corrupted, the
view of the adversary can be easily simulated (e.g., an encrypted or garbled
value can be simulated by a random number of the same bit length). As a result,
we can conclude that our algorithms achieve the privacy of garbled circuits,
whose privacy is formally proved in [16].
Therefore, as long as the auctioneer and the agent do not collude with each
other, PP-MCSA preserves privacy. 
6 Performance Evaluation
6.1 Experimental Setting
We implement our protocol in two cases: original implementation and improved
implementation. In the original implementation, we implement our algorithms
literally, while in the improved implementation, we implement them with cache
optimization, where we compute the repeatedly used sums (i.e., Lines 11, 15
& 17 in Alg. 2) just once and cache them for later use. Our experiments are
carried out on top of FastGC [20], a java-based framework for the garbled circuit
computations. We simulate the auctioneer and the agent with two processes on
the same computer. Experimental settings are as follows: buyers are randomly
distributed in a 2000m× 2000m area, and the interference radius is 400m. The
request values of sellers and the bid values of buyers are generated randomly
in the intervals [1..150] and [1..50], respectively. The both request numbers and
bid numbers are generated randomly in the interval [1..10], and thus D is set to
10 which is the maximum bid number. Throughout our experiments, we use bit
length 16, unless otherwise stated, and each point represents the average of 10
times simulation runs.
In the simulation, we run our protocol on a 64-bit Windows 7 Desktop with
Intel(R) Core(TM) i5 CPU @3.3GHz and 8GB of memory. We focus on the
following two performance metrics:
– Computation overhead: total running time for executing our protocol by the
auctioneer and the agent.
– Communication overhead: total communication cost (data size of all mes-
sages that are sent between the auctioneer and the agent).
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6.2 Result Analysis
We conduct experiments to compare the performance of the original and im-
proved implementations in two cases: (1) when the number of sellers varies; (2)
when the number of buyers varies. We further trace the performance of the im-
proved implementation (3) when the bit length of request values and bid values
varies; and (4) when bigger numbers of sellers and buyers vary.
(1) Number of sellers varies. Fig. 3 illustrates the comparisons of both
computation and communication overheads between the original and improved
implementations, when the number of sellers M increases from 50 to 100, and
the number of buyers is fixed at N = 500, and N = 600. We can see that both
running time and communication cost of the original implementation increase
much faster than those of the improved implementation. The reason is that the
cache optimization in the improved implementation (Lines 11, 15 and 17 in
Alg. 2) avoids repeating the addition computations in the nested loops, and thus
greatly reduces the computation and communication overheads.
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Fig. 3. Comparisons of computation and communication overheads between the original and
improved implementations as the number of sellers M varies.
(2) Number of buyers varies. Fig. 4 shows the performance comparisons
between the original and improved implementations, when the number of sell-
ers is fixed to M = 100 and M = 110, and the number of buyers N increases
from 200 to 600. Similar to Fig. 3, Fig. 4 demonstrates that the improved imple-
mentation is much more efficient than the original one in term of computation
and communication overheads. In the same way, the cache optimization is the
source of this performance improvement.
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Fig. 4. Comparisons of computation and communication overheads between the original and im-
proved implementations as the number of buyers N varies.
(3) Bit length varies. Fig. 5 traces the impact on performance when chang-
ing the bit length of bid values and request values in the improved implemen-
tation. We vary the bit length from 10 to 20, while fix the number of sellers at
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M = 80, and the number of buyers at N = 500. We can observe that both com-
putation and communication overheads grow linearly as the bit length increases.
This is natural, since most of the elemental boolean circuits (e.g., addition, com-
parison) grow linearly in size when the bit length of its input values increases.
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Fig. 5. Comparisons of computation and communication overheads between the original and
improved implementations as the bit length varies.
(4) Then bigger numbers of sellers and buyers vary. Fig. 6 traces the per-
formance of the improved implementation when the number of buyers varies
from 1500 to 3500, for the number of sellers M = 300, 400 and 500, respec-
tively. This figure shows that our improved implementation is rather efficient
in both computation and communication performance for bigger numbers. For
example, all running times are within 23min, and all communication costs are
within 1600MB. Meanwhile, both computation and communication overheads
scale gracefully as the numbers of sellers and buyers increase.
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Fig. 6. Computation and communication overheads of the improved implementation as the big
numbers of sellers and buyers vary.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed PP-MCSA, the first privacy-preserving mecha-
nism for multi-channel double spectrum auctions to our knowledge. To address
the challenges imposed by the multi-channel double spectrum auction scenario,
we have leveraged garbled circuits in our protocol design. Specifically, we de-
sign data-oblivious algorithms whose execution path does not depend on their
sensitive inputs and then turn these algorithms into garbled circuits to address
the privacy challenge. Then, we use cache optimization, which caches some in-
termediate values to avoid repeated circuits, to improve the garbled circuits and
hence address the efficiency challenge. Finally, we have theoretically proved the
privacy of PP-MCSA, and experimentally shown that it incurs limited compu-
tation and communication overheads.
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A True-MCSA Auction
True-MCSA is a truthful double spectrum auction mechanism that allows multi-
channel requests from both buyers and sellers, while ensures spectrum reusabil-
ity. The symbols of the auction can be described in Tab. 1. Specifically, TRUE-
MCSA is composed of the following four steps:
Table 1. Key Symbols for TRUE-MCSA
M , N numbers of sellers and buyers
T numbers of buyer groups
sm, cm seller m’s request value and request number
bn,dn buyer n’s bid value and bid number
(xn, yn) location of buyer n
Dt maximal number of channel of group t
pi bid vector of virtual buyer group
S request vector of sellers
j(i) the seller in the ith trade
kl the last profitable trade
L sum of sellers channel number
G G = {Gt}Tt=1, global bid set of groups
Gt the tuple of group t
Gvt the tuple of virtual buyer group t
(1) Bid-independent Buyer Group Formation: In this step, the conflict
graph of buyers is constructed in term of their geographic locations, and buyers
that do not interfere with each other are grouped into the same group. In this
way, buyers in the same group can use the same channels without interference.
Note that the group formation algorithm should be bid-independent, otherwise
bid manipulation is allowed, and hence the auction becomes untruthful.
(2) Virtual Buyer Group (VBG) Splitting and Bidding: To address the
multi-channel requests from buyers, this step splits a buyer group Gt into Dt =
maxi∈Gt di virtual buyer groups (VBGs), where each VBG only requests for
one channel.
After splitting a buyer group into VBGs, we come up with the VBG bid-
ding. Paper [10] proposed two VBG bidding algorithms, member-minimized
(MMIN) and group-maximized (GMAX). We only review MMIN as follows.
To bid for each VBG derived from a buyer group, the group member with the
minimum bid is chosen as the critical buyer, which is removed from all the
derived VBGs. Then, each VBG bids with the minimum bid (i.e., the critical
buyer’s bid) multiplying its size after removing.
(3) Winner Determination: At this point, suppose after VBG splitting and
bidding we get totallyK VBGs with bid values {pik}Kk=1. Recall that we haveM
sellers with request values {sm}Mm=1. Then, this step applies McAfee’s frame-
work to winner determination as follows.
First of all, the sellers’ request values sm’s are sorted in non-decreasing
order, and the VBGs’ bid values pik’s are sorted in non-increasing order:
O′ : s1 ≤ s2 ≤ . . . ≤ sM
O′′ : pi1 ≥ pi2 ≥ . . . ≥ piK
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Then, each seller’s request value sm is rewritten as many times as the num-
ber cm of channels he bid, resulting in the bid mapping between sellers and
VBGs as follows:
O′ :
c1︷ ︸︸ ︷
s1 ≤ ... ≤ s1 ≤
c2︷ ︸︸ ︷
s2 ≤ ... ≤ s2 ≤ ... ≤
cM︷ ︸︸ ︷
sM ≤ ... ≤ sM
O′′ :pi1≥ ...≥pic1≥pic1+1≥ ...≥pic1+c2≥ ... ≥pi1+∑M−1t=1 ct≥ ...≥piK
Finally, find the last profitable trade kl as:
kl = argmaxi≤min{L,K}{
∑i
t=1 pit ≥ i · sj(i)}
Here, L represents the total number of channels provided by sellers, namely,
L =
∑M
j=1 cj , and j(i) computes the seller index j when the trade index is i,
namely,
j(i) = 1 + arg max
0≤h≤M−1
{
h∑
t=1
ct < i}.
As a result, the last profitable seller is j(kl). In order to achieve truthfulness,
the last profitable seller, as well as all trades involving the seller, should be
sacrificed to price the winners. Then the auction winners are the first j(kl) − 1
sellers in O′ and the first k =
∑j(kl)−1
t=1 ct ≤ kl − 1 VBGs in O′′.
(4) Pricing: Each buyer in the same winning VBG pays an even share of the
VBG bid, and each winning channel is paid by the price sj(kl). As a result, each
winning buyer pays the sum of what it pays in all the winning VBGs it belongs
to, and each winning seller is paid with the product of multiplying its request
number and the price sj(kl).
